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Abstract—This paper presents a method to evaluate the
availability and resiliency of a modern distribution grid using
Stochastic Reward Nets (SRNs). SRNs are a modelling formalism
used to evaluate the complex dependencies of components during
fault recovery. The method is verified using the RBTS Bus 2 Test
system and then applied to an enhanced version of the distribu-
tion grid which employs remote communications and distribution
automation to hasten the recovery process. Sensitivity analysis is
applied to the enhanced version of the test system to demonstrate
improvements in recovery time and reduction in downtime with
respect to to component failure. Finally, resiliency analysis is
performed to the enhanced system to evaluate the systems ability
to recover from abnormal and severe events and demonstrate
the improvements that this technology provides.
Index Terms—Distribution grid, availability, resiliency, SAIDI,
smart grid
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a large amount of innovation
in power distribution grids and their protection systems. One
area of focus is the reduction in the impact of faults by im-
proving the recovery process when faults occur . Distribution
grids are generally assembled in a mesh structure and operated
in a radial manner. This means that there are multiple paths
that can be used to deliver power to each load point on a
grid, but only a single path is online at any time due to the
utilisation of distributed sectionalising switches. This strategy
is employed to reduce the overall downtime experienced by
customers. When a component fails the grid operators can use
sectionalising switches to restore power to a portion of the
affected customers through alternate routes, without needing
to repair the failed component. This methodology is known
as Fault Detection, Isolation and Repair (FDIR) and is a key
part of distribution automation schemes.
The purpose of FDIR is to reduce the total impact on
customers served by a distribution grid due to failure. An
important application of reliable communications in modern
distribution grids is to automate this reconfiguration process
with remotely controlled switches and sensors. Automation of
the reconfiguration process has resulted in a major reduction
of the time it takes to restore customer power because of the
reduction in time it takes to locate a fault and the time it takes
to reconfigure the grid. In some cases this process has reduced
the outage time of customers to minutes or even seconds. In
one case in the USA, 40,000 out of 80,000 customers had
their power restored within 2 seconds after a wide-spread
failure due to distribution automation [1]. The deployment
of remotely controlled switches and sensors onto the smart
grid has made them resemble distributed computer systems.
Because of this, techniques from the field of distributed
computing are able to be applied to evaluate the reliability,
availability and resilience of distribution grids.
Abstracting a distribution grid to model its availability
using a state-based Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC)
is an error-prone and tedious process [2]. This is due to
the complexity of the large number of states which must be
considered. Stochastic Reward Nets (SRNs) are an alternative
to CTMCs that contain connected graphs which contain two
types of node; places and transitions. Each place contains
zero or more tokens which move between places when
transitions fire. They provide the ability to analyse individual
parts of complex distribution grids by deconstructing them
into separate components. Each component exists separately,
but its dependencies on other components can be modelled
using logic-based guard functions. This removes the need to
explicitly define every permutation of the possible system
states, because these are automatically generated using the
formalism. A logic-based reward function is defined to deter-
mine the availability of a system.
SRNs expand on stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) by augment-
ing them with output measures specified with reward functions
[2]. They provide a high-level interface for the concise spec-
ification of large, complex systems. This paper utilises SRNs
to evaluate modern smart grid technology. Specifically, the
contribution of near-instantaneous post-fault reconfiguration
provided by reliable communications is evaluated. For this
paper, we will consider near-instantaneous reconfiguration,
which is of the order of seconds, as instantaneous. It is shown
how this technology improves the day-to-day performance,
measured by the System Average Interruption Duration Index
(SAIDI) [3], which represents the average outage time of
each customer per year. Finally, it is shown how reliable
communications can enhance the resilience of a distribution
grid to unpredictable events such as severe weather.
Section I-A discusses related work. Section II introduces
the system being analysed and the concepts of SRNs. Sections
III and IV employ SRNs to conduct a sensitivity and resiliency
analysis of the system and presents and discusses the results.
Section V concludes the paper.
A. Related Work
There are several examples of SPNs applied to distribution
grids for a number of purposes, ranging from fault-diagnosis
to load-transfer optimisation [4]. Works similar to the top-
ics of this paper include [5], which presents a method to
identify faults, [6], which assesses unavailability of SCADA
communications and [7] which evaluates the reliability of
small power systems using Fluid SPNs. Reliability and avail-
ability analysis of distribution grids using SPNs is a largely
untouched method. This paper demonstrates that applying
reward functions to stochastic Petri nets (to develop SRNs)
in order to model availability of power distribution systems is
straightforward and valuable insight can be gained from doing
so.
II. SYSTEM AVAILABILITY MODEL
The system being modelled for this paper is Feeder 1 and
Feeder 2 of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS) Bus 2 Test
System [8], shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Feeder 1 (F1) and 2 (F2) of the RBTS Bus 2
distribution grid test system, adapted from [8].
The component parameters for the RBTS Bus 2 can be
found in the test system paper [8]. Assumptions for this
system are summarised as follows:
• Protection and reconfiguration equipment cannot fail.
• Fault protection devices (CBs, fuses) operate instantly.
• All failures are detected by the protection equipment.
• All failure rates are unchanging in time and are expo-
nentially distributed.
• The fault isolation rate remains constant regardless of
how many components have already failed.
Availability analysis of Feeder 1 is performed using SRNs.
This has been chosen because the variation in its load
point topology illustrate all of the interesting features of the
analysis. There are numerous software packages available to
evaluate SRN models. The authors have used SHARPE [9]
and SPNP [10] to evaluate the SRN in this paper. These
packages use the given model to generate a reachability graph
of the system, based on the transitions, places, arcs and
defined reward functions. This reachability graph is a CTMC
which can be solved using numerical techniques which are
described in detail in [2].
A. Demonstration of Method
This section demonstrates that assembling the SRN for the
RBTS Bus 2 test system produces the same availability results
as are given in the paper, if the same assumptions are made. It
constructs a SRN for load point 3, which is denoted LP3, and
present the results for the remaining load points in a table.
The components relevant to LP3 are:
• Supply feeder lines (L1, L4, L7 and L10)
• Lateral line (L5)
• 11/0.415kV transformer (t3)
• Substation and 33kV system
• Interconnecting ring main
• Redundant supply feeder via ring main (L12, L14)
For this example the substation and 33kV section of the
system are perfectly reliable and thus not included in the
availabilty model.
This SRN is created to model the availability of LP3. As
such simplifications of the system can be made. Firstly, from
the perspective of LP3, the lines of Feeder 2 provide an
alternate supply when lines before LP3 along Feeder 1 fail
and are isolated. These Feeder 2 lines can be modelled as in
series because failure of either of these removes their ability
to provide an alternate supply. They can modelled as a two-
state component of the SRN. This component is labelled F2
and is part e in the SRN diagram
Each load point connects to the main feeder through a
lateral. These are composed of a fuse, a line, in some
cases a transformer. A failure in any of these components is
immediately disconnected from the system by the fuse. This
means that the failure of any component on a lateral only
affects the load point that the failed lateral supplies. For LP3,
the line L5 and transformer t3 make up the lateral. They are
in series, and as such they can be combined into a two-state
SRN. This component is labelled Lat3 and is part d in the
SRN diagram
Each line component along Feeder 1 can fail, and when
this occurs it can be isolated using normally-closed switches.
There is one of these switches placed between each labelled
line. These are illustrated in the detail of Figure 1. When a
failure occurs on any of the feeder lines on either feeder, the
circuit breaker at the base of the feeder detects the fault current
and opens. This disconnects the failed component, along with
the rest of the feeder, from the source, deenergising every load
point supplied. Along both feeders there are normally-closed
sectionalising switches which can be operated when a line is
deenergised. When a fault occurs, they are employed to isolate
the faulted component from the rest of the system. The ring
main unit connecting the two feeders can be used to supply
load points beyond the failed component, along the feeder.
This process is referred to as fault isolation. After a failure
is repaired, the reverse occurs. The ring main disconnects
the two feeders and the open sectionalisers are closed. This
process is assumed to take the same amount of time as the
fault isolation. These components are parts a,b,c and f for
lines L1, L4, L7 and L10 respectively.
Because feeder lines require isolation before they can
be repaired, they require more than a two-state system to
represent each of them. For the system presented here, there
are four places used to represent four possible states of each
feeder line. Load point 3 has four relevant 4-place feeder line
components. These are all similarly shaped, with different
failure rates, repair times and reconfiguration times. The 4-
state component modelling line 1 follows:
• PL1 ok is the default place and represents the state where
the line is operating as intended.
• PL1 failed represents failure of line L1. It is entered at
rate λL1 = 1/MTTFL1, from place PL1 ok.
• PL1 isolated represents the state where sectionalisers and
ring mains have isolated the failed line and provided
alternate supply to the load point if possible. This state
is entered from PL1 failed at rate i = 1/MTTI , where
MTTI is the mean time to isolate the failed component
and operate the ring main if needed. i is the isolation
rate.
• PL1 repaired represents the state where the line is still
isolated, but has been repaired. It is entered at rate µ′L1 =
1
(MTTRL1)−2MTTI)] from PL1 isolated. MTTRL1 is the
mean time to repair for L1. The time taken to isolate
the component (MTTI = 1/i) and the time required
to reconnect the component (MTTI) is included in the
MTTR metric but these steps have been separated in this
SRN, so the time taken to do so must be subtracted to
have the correct repair rate.
• PL1 ok is entered from PL1 repaired at rate i. This
transition models the reconnection of a feeder line to
the feeder after it has been repaired.
These above conditions create the SRN of LP3 shown in
Figure 2.
Fig. 2: SRN used to model availability of LP3 on Feeder 1
Based on the SRN defined here, a reward function is created
to determine when load point LP3 is online, in order to
calculate availability. For LP3 to be online it requires the
lateral Lat3 and the line L4 to be online. This is because
there are no switches available to isolate LP3 from L4. If these
two components are online, there are two cases where LP3
is online. The first where LP3 is connected to the substation
through Feeder 1. For this condition to be met, there must
be an unbroken path to the source, and no components along
the feeder which would cause the circuit breaker to operate
(i.e. no components with a token in the PLx failed place. The
alternative case which would allow LP3 to be online is if
it is supplied through Feeder 2. This requires Feeder 2 to
be online, the lines connecting LP3 to the ring main to be
online, and the remaining feeder lines to not be in a failed
state. These configurations produce the reward function for
LP3’s availability shown in Table I amongst the functions for
the other 7 load points in the modelled system.
This SRN was evaluated with SHARPE, using the rates
described in the RBTS Bus 2 test system, and the same
availability values are calculated for this as are given for the
test system.
III. AVAILABILITY AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
For this paper, the aim is to evaluate the improvements
obtained by enhancing the reconfiguration process which takes
place after a fault occurs. Reconfiguration is used to restore
service to as many load points in the system as possible, by
using distributed switches to separate load points from the
faulted component and connect them to alternate sources, or
through alternate paths.
The method described in Section II-A has been applied to
all the load points of Feeder 1 of the RBTS Bus 2 test system.
The results are presented in as downtime (hr/yr) and can be
seen in the second column of Table II. The same analysis
was conducted on the system with the reconfiguration time
(for both isolation and reconnection) set to zero. The results
for this can be seen in the third column.
A. Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity of the load point downtime (in hours per
year) to component failure rate is now assessed for both
delayed and instantaneous reconfiguration. For the RBTS, the
time taken to reconfigure after a fault is 1 hour. Figure 3
shows the downtime for LP3 when varying each feeder line
MTTF, for both delayed and instantaneous reconfiguration.
While each line MTTF is being changes, the remaining are
kept at there defined value.
To evaluate the contribution of instantaneous reconfigu-
ration to system availability, a sensitivity analysis of the
system SAIDI to MTTF of each feeder line, for both delayed
reconfiguration (1hr) and instantaneous reconfigurations is
conducted. Figure 4 shows the contribution of each component
to the system SAIDI value.
Analysis reveals two features in Figures 3 and 4. It can
be seen that there is a constant reduction in downtime for
TABLE I: Availability reward function for LP3
Function Definition
ss avail LP3() if(#PL4 ok==1 && #PLat3 ok==1 && (#PL1 ok==1 && #PL7 failed==0 && #PL10 failed==0)
|| (#PL1 failed==0 && #PL7 ok==1 && #PL10 ok==1 && #PF2 ok==1)) 1 else 0
TABLE II: Downtime of each load point for system with
delayed and instantaneous reconfiguration in hr/yr





























Fig. 3: Downtime of LP1 for varied feeder line MTTF, for
delayed and instantaneous reconfiguration
all feeder line MTTF values, caused by the hastened re-
configuration. Secondly, after instantaneous reconfiguration is
introduced, LP3 becomes immune to failures which occur on
feeder lines that it can be separated from. The contribution of
instantaneous reconfiguration may be limited by the topology
of the grid. This is because sectionalisers can only assist in
isolating a load point from a failed component if they are
placed in a location between the two. Additionally, recon-
figuration is only a portion of the recovery process. For load
points which can’t be isolated from a fault, the only reduction
in outage time gained from hasted reconfiguratioon results
from the repairs beginning faster.
This technique allows us to observe from a system per-
spective how the protection and reconfiguration equipment
of a distribution grid assists in fault recovery. It is able to
highlight the overall contribution that can be made by both
the topology of protection equipment on a grid, and also by
the speed in which it operates. This methodology can be used
to optimise where distribution grid reconfiguration devices are
deployed in order to reduce outage time for as many customers
as possible.


















Fig. 4: SAIDI of Feeder 1 for varied feeder line MTTF, for
delayed and instantaneous reconfiguration
IV. AVAILABILITY RESILIENCE ANALYSIS
Resiliency can be assessed by introducing parametric
changes to a system by reducing the MTTF of a component
to far below normal range. The system availability is then
assessed to determine how this parametric change has affected
it. If the change in availability is small, it can be said that the
system availability is resilient to the MTTF of the altered
component [11]. This analysis provides valuable insight into
how the system can withstand abnormal events such as severe
weather or earthquakes.
Figure 5 presents the results for the resiliency analysis
of feeder line L4. It shows four different configurations and
presents these for each load point. The first is the downtime of
the load point when all component MTTF values are normal
and reconfiguration time is unadjusted. The second is the
downtime of the load point when the MTTF of each com-
ponent is 1% of its normal value, and hence very unreliable.
The third is the system with normal component MTTF values,
but with instantaneous reconfiguration and the final is where
the MTTF is 1% of its normal value and the reconfiguration
is instantaneous.
From this figure it can be seen that the introduction of
instantaneous reconfiguration after a fault means that the
failed components can be quickly isolated and the resulting
outage time reduced to negligible amounts. The exceptions to
this are components which cannot be isolated from the load
points LP3 and LP4, and the full duration of the repair must be
endured when these components fail. Instant reconfiguration
removes the effect of a failure of a component on any load
point which can be isolated from it. Based on this analysis,
it can be seen that load point downtime is resilient to feeder
line failures which are able to be disconnected from the load
point.



















Fig. 5: Downtime of each load point before and after setting
L4 MTTF to 1% of its value, with delayed and instant
reconfiguration.


















Fig. 6: Feeder 1 SAIDI, before and after setting each com-
ponent MTTF to 1% of value, with delayed and instant
reconfiguration.
The contribution of post-fault instantaneous reconfiguration
on system resiliency in the form of changes in SAIDI can
be seen in Figure 6. This has the same four configurations
presented in Figure 5, but for system SAIDI, and for each
feeder line MTTF that has been changed. It displays the
contribution of instantaneous reconfiguration to system SAIDI
resilience against the reduction of MTTF of an individual
component to 1% of current value. The key feature of this
figure is the increase in SAIDI when the parametric change
is introduced to each component. This step is always smaller
when instantaneous reconfiguration is used. The step is very
small when the reconfiguration is instantaneous for faults in
L7 and L10. This is due to the majority of customers supplied
by the feeder being connected to LP1, LP2 and LP3. Hence
most of the population is immune to faults along L7 and L10.
With the introduction of instantaneous reconfiguration after a
fault, the SAIDI of this feeder is more resilient.
SRNs can assess system resilience by inspecting how a
severe change in a single components reliability affects the
system as a whole, thus determining how resilient the grid is
to failures in the altered component. This methodology in its
current form gives an indication of resilience, but does not
provide an overall numerical value for system resilience. As
such, it cannot be used yet for optimisation of resilience in a
distribution in a distribution network in its current form. This
is future work for the authors.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper Stochastic Reward Nets are presented as a
method to assess modern advances of the distribution grid.
They are used to evaluate the availability and resiliency
improvements gained by enhancing fault recovery techniques,
specifically by deploying remote switching and distribution
automation making post-failure reconfiguration instantaneous.
Sensitivity analysis reveals the contribution of instantaneous
reconfiguration is a steady reduction in the downtime of all
load points because the repair process is shorter. It also reveals
instantaneous reconfiguration makes load points immune to
failures that they can be separated from using distributed
switches. Resiliency analysis is presented and reveals that cor-
rectly placed sectionalisers improve distribution grid resilience
because they can isolate faults from the majority of customers
supplied by the feeder, particularly if the reconfiguration is
instantaneous. SRNs can be used to deconstruct distribution
grid in a straightforward way in order to assess the contribu-
tion that modern technology has to improving the availability
of distribution grids. This paper assesses the addition of
remote sectionalisers and distribution automation. Future work
for this techniques includes assessing the contribution of
distributed generation and microgrid systems.
REFERENCES
[1] P. A. Hoffman, “2014 smart grid report to congress,” report, Energy,
U.S. Department of, 2014.
[2] K. S. Trivedi, Probability & statistics with reliability, queuing and
computer science applications. John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2002.
[3] R. Billinton and R. N. Allan, Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems.
Plenum Press, New York, 2nd ed., 1996.
[4] Z. Lin, F. Wen, C. Chung, and K. Wong, “A survey on the applications
of Petri net theory in power systems,” in Power Engineering Society
General Meeting, 2006. IEEE, pp. 1–7, IEEE, 2006.
[5] V. Calderaro, C. N. Hadjicostis, A. Piccolo, and P. Siano, “Failure
identification in smart grids based on Petri net modeling,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 58, no. 10, pp. 4613–4623,
2011.
[6] A. Bobbio, G. Bonanni, E. Ciancamerla, R. Clemente, A. Iacomini,
M. Minichino, A. Scarlatti, R. Terruggia, and E. Zendri, “Unavailability
of critical SCADA communication links interconnecting a power grid
and a telco network,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 95,
no. 12, pp. 1345–1357, 2010.
[7] Y. A. Katsigiannis, P. S. Georgilakis, and G. J. Tsinarakis, “A novel col-
ored fluid stochastic Petri net simulation model for reliability evaluation
of wind/pv/diesel small isolated power systems,” IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics-Part A: Systems and Humans, vol. 40,
no. 6, pp. 1296–1309, 2010.
[8] R. N. Allan, R. Billinton, I. Sjarief, L. Goel, and K. S. So, “A reliability
test system for educational purposes-basic distribution system data and
results,” Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 813–
820, 1991.
[9] K. S. Trivedi and R. Sahner, “SHARPE at the age of twenty two,”
SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 52–57, 2009.
[10] G. Ciardo, J. Muppala, and K. Trivedi, “SPNP: stochastic Petri net
package,” in Petri Nets and Performance Models, 1989. PNPM89.,
Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on, pp. 142–151,
IEEE, 1989.
[11] R. Ghosh, D. S. Kim, and K. S. Trivedi, “System resiliency quantifica-
tion using non-state-space and state-space analytical models,” Reliability
Engineering and System Safety, vol. 116, pp. 109–125, 2013.
